"These [the Bereans] were more fairminded than those in Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness, and searched the Scriptures daily to find out whether these things were so." (Acts 17:11; NKJV)
Saturday, January 7, 2012
Alasdair MacIntyre: A Study in Moral Theory
ReviewReview:
Review:
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
Alasdair MacIntyre
University of Notre Dame Press, 3rd Ed., 2007
286 pp. pbk.
After Virtue, written by Alasdair MacIntyre, who is currently a professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, has become one of the most influential books dealing with the subject of ethics written in our time. It has sparked discussion around the world (in at least eleven different languages, including Turkish, Chinese and Japanese), and had made its influence felt in the "emerging church": Brian McLaren has acknowledged his indebtedness to MacIntyre's book.
MacIntyre is a native of Glasgow, Scotland, and began his teaching career in the U.K. before emigrating to the U.S. around 1969. Since then he has held a large number of different teaching positions in leading colleges and universities across the U.S.
In addition to his academic wanderings MacIntyre has been on something of an intellectual voyage as well. Basically a disillusioned Marxist, he converted to the Catholic Church in the early 1980's. In his philosophy he has tried to combine insights from Marx with those of Aristotle, and now identifies himself as a Thomist.
MacIntyre argues that we find ourselves in a situation in which it is nearly impossible to resolve conflicts over basic moral principles. Part of the reason for this is confusion over terminology. Western culture has changed greatly over the past several centuries, and yet we still use the terminology of the past when people thought very differently about morality than we do today.
MacIntyre traces the problem back to what he calls "the failure of the Enlightenment project." The Enlightenment thinkers posited man as an autonomous moral agent. Rejecting authority in morality, the attempted instead to find a universally valid ethical norm based on pure reason alone. But by abandoning the idea of divine purpose or design they created an unbridgeable gap between the content of traditional morality and human nature as it actually exists. In other words, they were faced with the central problem of how to deduce an "ought" from an "is." The inevitable result was that by the end of the nineteenth century at least some philosophers had concluded that there is nothing to morality than personal preference (Emotivism). The moral autonomy of the Enlightenment led very naturally to the outright nihilism of Nietzsche.
MacIntyre, however, tells us that there is another way, and suggests that we take a closer look at Aristotle. The apparent attraction of Aristotle consists in the fact that the ancient sage offers us an essentially sociological conception of "virtue." A "virtue" () is not a principle derived from a universal law, but rather an admirable quality or characteristic that will enable us to live happily in human society. What determines a "virtue" then, is largely determined by society.
According to MacIntyre's own theory, a virtue is largely determined by three factors: practices, traditions, and the narrative unity of human lives (p. xi). A "practice" is a field of human endeavor that imposes its own requirements necessary for success, such as the practice of law or medicine. The "narrative unity" of our personal lives is what gives our individual actions moral significance. All three of these factors (practices, traditions, and narrative unity) are essentially local and culture-specific, and as such will vary from one society to the next. This has left MacIntyre open to charges of relativism and communitarianism.
MacIntyre's theory is fraught with manifold practical difficulties. Take, for example, his concept of "practices." While it is true that some fields constitute "practices" with defined standards of conduct focused on "internal goods" (e.g. sports, the military), others do not (most low level hourly paid jobs). This means that a large share of the population is left without a "practice" in which to demonstrate a "virtue." Their only motivation for work is the measly prospect of "external goods" (i.e., money), an unworthy motive in MacIntyre's estimation. Moreover, come practices involve norms that MacIntyre clearly feels are objectionable. The old Soviet Politburo and yes, the American business community, both fall within this category. Here the practice would require behavior that involves harming other people, socially or economically.
And what about "traditions"? Here MacIntyre must face the fact that the Russian tradition is authoritarian and the American tradition is strongly individualistic, both of which MacIntyre finds objectionable.
And what if a given society has conflicting traditions? On what basis do we resolve the conflict? How do we know which tradition to accept and which to modify or reject? American culture, for example, has strong elements of both Evangelical Protestantism and laissez-faire capitalism, and these sometimes come into conflict with each other. Shall we call our devotion to the almighty dollar "the profit motive" or just plain "filthy lucre"? MacIntyre would have us to believe that such internal conflicts are normal. But if they are normal, then what has moral philosophy solved? Very little, it would appear.
To argue that virtues are determined by practices and traditions is merely to push the question back one step further. Is it possible for the practice or tradition itself to be evil? Could not an entire society at times be evil? On what basis could we make such an evaluation?
It is not entirely clear in his book whether or not MacIntyre thinks that there is an objective standard of morality. On the surface he appears to be emphatic that there is not. He dismisses the divine command theory of morality, and ridicules the notion of "human rights." Belief in them, he says, is "one with belief in witches and unicorns" (p. 69). He criticizes the UN Declaration on Human Rights of 1949 for "not giving good reasons for any assertions whatsoever . . ." and concludes, "Natural or human rights then are fictitious" (p. 70). But at other points he makes comments that seem to imply the existence of just such a standard.
MacIntyre tells us that at the time he wrote After Virtue he had been "preoccupied with the question of the basis for the rejection of Stalinism" (p. xvii). But if his aim is to counter the abuses of both Stalinist tyranny and cutthroat capitalism, his argument has led us to an ironic conclusion. Does not the evil endemic in both systems stem from the very fact that neither wants to acknowledge a universally valid higher law? And if virtues are determined by practices, traditions and personal narrative, then were not both Joseph Stalin and John D. Rockefellar acting virtuously? Were they not both acting consistently within their local practices, traditions and narratives?
If morality is determined by society, and there is no higher law, no transcendent standard of justice or morality, then the power of the state is left unchecked. There is no higher court to which to appeal, no answer to the crushing brutality of the all powerful state. Minority rights disappear altogether. It is the tyranny of the majority completely unfettered, for no room for dissent of any kind. We cannot help but think that in MacIntyre's case the prescribed medicine is at least as bad as the disease itself.
Ironically what MacIntyre has done is to reject the part of the Enlightenment that was classical, viz., its belief in truth, beauty, morality and justice, and has kept that part which was truly modern, viz., its secular outlook, its skepticism, its rationalist method, and its materialist philosophy. He got rid of Mozart and kept Robespierre! It was this modern aspect of the Enlightenment that eventually led to Nietzsche and all the horrors of 20th Century totalitarianism.
By giving up belief in a universal moral standard Dr. MacIntyre has essentially eliminated the element of duty or obligation from morality. What he offers us is essentially a morality of convenience. But ultimately each individual decides for himself what is convenient. To a scholarly gentleman like Dr. MacIntyre it might be a quiet evening playing chess with a friend, but to the street hustler it might be successfully executing a drug sale, and Dr. MacIntyre might be hard pressed to explain why the drug dealer is "wrong," if it is even possible in his account to use such a term.
But try as he might, Dr. MacIntyre cannot escape the law of God. It is written on his heart. He cannot give up his conscience without giving up his own humanity. That is why he instinctively recoils at capitalist greed and Stalinist oppression. He has not been able to explain why he feels that way, but he unmistakably does. The answer to his dilemma is only to be found in God.
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No, the answer to his dilemma is NOT to be found only in god. That is dishonest. There is all kinds of evidence that how we feel about moral and ethical issues has a very strong biological basis. This is not equivalent in any way to the law of god - whatever that may mean - written on his heart. This is an empty attribution devoid of any evidence whatsoever other than your belief to inform it. Your belief, in other words, is not a position of knowledge to utter such absolutes as The answer to his dilemma is only to be found in God. Your answer is an absence of any meaningful, evidential, demonstrable, causal, explanatory knowledge. It is belief, pure and simple, that does not attempt to explain the evidence for moral and ethical behaviour we do have but imposes this unknowable term 'god' over moral and ethical issues that grants license to its spokesmen to pretend that they just so happen to know this deity's wishes. This, too, is dishonest and provides no answer worth anything but our collective disdain at such ridiculous and dishonest presumption.
ReplyDeleteAh, the gift that keeps on giving.
ReplyDelete"But try as he might, Dr. MacIntyre cannot escape the law of Viracocha. It is written on his heart. He cannot give up his conscience without giving up his own humanity. That is why he instinctively recoils at capitalist greed and Stalinist oppression. He has not been able to explain why he feels that way, but he unmistakably does. The answer to his dilemma is only to be found in Viracocha."
We are all atheists about most of the gods humanity has ever believed in. Some of us just go one god further. – Richard Dawkins
Well, Bob, it seems they are using the same tactics on your site as they are mine.
ReplyDeleteTildeb points to belief and says it's nonsense. Then Cedric brings other bits of nonsense and inserts them into your statements.
And yet, still they have not answered any part of the substance of your post.
You see, this is all about willful rejection to have a real conversation and it's justification lies in the definitions they give to gods and religions. They define them so broadly that they become devoid of any definition at all, which gives the illusion that the issue is decidedly in their favor (supposedly).
All they are doing is mockery. They display astounding ignorance to anything religious and come off sounding like fools. This inability to distinguish one concept from another hasn't actually destroyed any religious arguments, but has produced enough soundbites and slogans to give them a rise in popularity. All an aspiring atheist has to do is cling to a few of their slogans and convince himself that that is all the research he needs to fully inform himself on the issues.
If the movement loses momentum, so will the slogans, and so will the pseudo-arguments. There are no actual arguments to hold the new atheists up. There are only the old arguments from the honest atheists of the past.
Of course, we really don't accept their definitions of gods and religions. That would be silly. So, there really is no meaningful conversation going on here.
Well, Bob, it seems they are using the same tactics on your site as they are mine.
ReplyDeleteMaybe Bob will follow your shameful example and just censor comments? One push of a button and it will all magically go away.
(It works in North Korea.)
At least, it will go away on your site.
You'll still remember it though.
Tildeb points to belief and says it's nonsense. Then Cedric brings other bits of nonsense and inserts them into your statements.
No, I swap the labels around.
Try it for yourself.
Pick a god from human history. Any god.
Choose a god that is total nonsense. The more nonsensical the better. A god that you would have to have rocks in your head to believe in.
You've picked one?
Good.
Now take some of your statements about your brand-name god or just find a few on the internet.
It's could be "[Insert your brand here] is the moonbeam in my heart".
Or "Unbelievers hate and fear [Insert your brand here] because it means giving up their wicked ways".
Or "Look at a baby's smile. It's so perfect and beautiful. Only the grace of [Insert your brand here] could be responsible for creating it.
Now insert the "nonsense" label.
DON'T CHANGE ANYTHING ELSE.
Keep the actual statement intact. Change nothing except the label. No cheating.
You see, this is all about willful rejection to have a real conversation.
That's a tad rich coming from a guy who censors comments.
...and it's justification lies in the definitions they give to gods and religions. They define them so broadly that they become devoid of any definition at all...
No, no, no.
They are your definitions. Your statements.
Nothing to do with us.
It's all original material from you.
I'm just borrowing them and switching the labels around.
The definitions and claims remain perfectly intact.
All they are doing is mockery.
No.
I'm taking your claims and switching the labels around. If you read your own claims with adjusted labels and it strikes you as mockery then...that says volumes about your own statements.
Think about it.
They display astounding ignorance to anything religious and come off sounding like fools.
My ignorance of anything is not important.
It's nothing to do with me.
I'm not making a claim.
I'm taking your claim and switching the words around. They are your statements.
This inability to distinguish one concept from another hasn't actually destroyed any religious arguments...
That's your inablility. Not mine. Yours.
Remember these precious gems?
“I love pink, invisible unicorns because they love me. It’s quite simple”
(...)
"The fact is that pink, invisible unicorns grasp us more than we grasp them.”
(...)
"The witness in my heart of pink, invisible unicorns isn’t vulnerable to outside critique."
So beautiful. So very beautiful.
Of course, we really don't accept their definitions of gods and religions. That would be silly.
They are your definitions.
I'm just switching the labels around.
Yet that one simple act makes your own definitions sound silly even to you.
That's devastating.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteIrrelevantaxiom was quite right to notice that neither Tildeb nor Cedric have answered any part of the substance of my post. MacIntyre is a well known philosopher who has wrestled with the question of morality and ethics from a mainly secular standpoint (I am not quite sure how he landed a teaching position at Notre Dame, and got his book published by the Universtity press there). I tried to point out in my review that MacIntyre's theory raises some disturbing questions about human rights in particular. And as you note, neither Tildeb nor Cedric attempted to interact with either MacIntyre's arguments or my rebuttal. Instead they seized on the last paragraph of my post and simply ridiculed it.
ReplyDeleteIt reminds me a little of the advice that was once given by an experienced attorney to a young lawyer: If you have the law on your side, pound on the law. If you have the facts on your side, pound on the facts. If you have neither the law nor the facts on your side, pound on the table!
To be fair, Cedric did make somewhat of an attempt to rebut some of my arguments on my previous 2 or 3 blog posts. But when he ended his last comment with "That's devastating," it almost sounds like he's trying to convince himself as much as anyone else.
Bob, I actually enjoyed your review of MacIntyre. Having not read any of his works, I feel in no position to argue his points you present because I don't know if you've represented them fairly. I assume you have, so I read what you wrote and thought about the points raised. That's as far as I can take them.
ReplyDeleteBut then you insert that last paragraph and I can take you to task for making such pronouncements as if they were true.
Morality and ethics are notoriously tricky beasts to examine because the terms themselves are so slippery. For example, I arbitrarily place morality into questions of right and wrong (including the sense of 'right' from the Greek philosophers) whereas ethics I attribute to be about correct behaviour. Understandably, the two are often connected but any study of morality and ethics that jumps to the supernatural as if it were a meaningful journey takes the issues out of anything knowable and into the realm of the unknowable, which serves no useful or practical purpose. The truth is, Bob, that neither you nor I know anything - or even can know anything - at all about realms of so-called reality beyond the one you and I currently inhabit. You often pretend otherwise and I simply call you on it. That may be 'banging on the table' to you, but in the absence of both facts and human written law, it seems perfectly reasonable. I do so because when you extend your false claims into the public domain, you invite such criticism and kudos to you to keep them available to your readership. Far too many theocratic cowards like irrelevantaxiom moderate and ban legitimate criticism to maintain the purity, presumably, of their little echo chambers, all the while attempting to influence others dishonestly. If it's a conversation you want, then I am perfectly willing to engage in it.
I, of course, did not see the comment that Irrelevantaxiom deleted form his blog, so I don't know if it constituted "moderate and legitimate criticism." I know that here on my blog I want to encourage and honest and candid debate about the issues that really matter, and for that reason I would be reluctant to let someone ridicule someone else who posts a comment. I have seen discussions on other blogs (I hesitate to call them "dark dens") that degenerated into ugly shouting matches. We want to avoid that here, and for that reason I reserve the right to delete a comment that is "below the belt," so to speak. If someone wants to call me an idiot, I can live with that, but please take it easy on others who may wish to comment.
ReplyDeleteAnd as you note, neither Tildeb nor Cedric attempted to interact with either MacIntyre's arguments or my rebuttal. Instead they seized on the last paragraph of my post and simply ridiculed it.
ReplyDeleteThat was the weak bit.
The rest of it was ok.