Dan Fincke on the Validity of Morality

Introducing Dr. Fincke
    One of the more difficult challenges facing atheists is that of establishing a basis for morality. Individual atheists, of course, are capable of being decent, humane, and civilized people. They are, after all, human beings and have feelings just like the rest of us (at least the ones that aren't scientists!). But the problem lies in trying to establish an objective code of conduct. If there is no God one would suppose that there are no transcendent, universally binding rules. In trying to establish a code of morality the atheist runs up against what is known as "the naturalistic fallacy," the problem of trying to deduce an "ought" from an "is." He can say what is, but he cannot say what ought to be. All he knows is that things are just the way they are. It is precisely this point that gives many of the rest of us grave misgivings about atheism. It erodes the very foundations of civilization.
    Dr. Daniel Fincke, however, an atheist blogger at Patheos, believes that he has found a way out of the problem. Raised in a devout evangelical Christian home, he underwent a difficult process of deconversion and eventually became enamored with the writings of Nietzsche. He went on to earn a doctorate in philosophy and has several teaching positions at universities in the metropolitan New York area. He specializes in writing about ethics and morality.
    Dr. Fincke has devoted a page on his website to an essay entitled "Morality's Validity".  Most of the essay is devoted to refuting the extreme nihilist position. He describes himself as "an indirect consequentialist" and says that he believes in "modest, non-absolutist, instrumental moral norms." What he apparently means by this is that values and moral norms are not completely relative. As human beings we have the shared experience of living in a physical environment and in human society. As a result, actions have consequences, some of them detrimental. Therefore some choices in life are manifestly better than others, and this forms the basis for an objective moral code. Dr. Fincke summarizes his position this way: we have an "intrinsic rational interest in pursuing our own functioning, on pain of practical contradiction if we choose otherwise." He says "we can rank competing values and recognize that the kinds of achievements for powerfully living in, predicting and mastering the world that we get from thinking like modern, scientific people make our standards of rational investigation and affirmation better than theirs. Our values and the norms we follow are in some ways truly better." What he appears to be offering then is a modern, scientific version of Utilitarianism, the doctrine of the greatest good for the greatest number, with the "good" defined in terms of usefulness.

 
But who decides?

 
    The theory sounds attractive on the surface, but on closer inspection is fraught with difficulties. Dr. Fincke says that "our" values and norms are truly better than "theirs." But who are "we" and "they"? Who decides which values make for "achievements for powerfully living" and "mastering the world"? The problem here, quite simply, is that oftentimes crime pays. If moral standards are based on "our own functioning," then the drug dealer, the organized crime boss, the predatory capitalist, and the crooked politician can all claim to be acting morally, since they are all apparently successful at what they are doing. To their minds they have made rational choices in life, and their choices are paying off. Nice guys finish last!
    There is an obvious objection to this, of course. Because we are constrained to live in human society, we have to have a common set of rules. And so we are said to have entered into a "social contract" with our fellow human beings, and in so doing have surrendered some of our individual autonomy to some central authority. There is then some sort of political process that makes rules for society as a whole. But is this really the same thing as "morality"? Several problems arise.
    First of all, there are some human actions that are too petty to fall under the purview of civil legislation – things like gossip, lying and quarreling. Are these things moral just because they are legal?
    Then there are the logical inconsistencies that arise in the laws. Selling marijuana is still illegal in most U.S. states, but selling tobacco is not. Does this make selling tobacco moral? What is the difference between the two? If anything, tobacco is more harmful that marijuana.
    And then there is the process by which laws are made. As they say in politics, you don't want to know how the sausage was made – it would turn your stomach. Can a corrupt process yield a moral result? Isn't politics itself often morally suspect?
    And what about morally dubious actions taken by the government itself? We have witnessed numerous instances of torture, aggression and genocide. On what basis can we say that these are wrong? By what standard shall the body politic as a whole be judged?
    So who decides, the individual or society? If the former, then there is no stability in government. If the latter, there is no room for dissent.
    Here we see the dilemma in which feminism finds itself. When it comes to abortion, feminists insist that morality is a matter of "personal choice" – due process of law simply doesn't apply. But when it comes to rape, it is a different story. No man has a right to rape a woman. But what about the moral autonomy of the rapist? Does he have "freedom of choice"? One would hope not. So are there universally binding norms or are there not? The feminist position looks suspiciously self-serving.

 
Problems with "functionality"

 
    But does "functionality" really give us clear answers to ethical questions? We see several problems here as well.
    First of all, how do we determine what is "functional"? How do we determine what the particular function of any particular thing is?
    The idea of "function" almost suggests the medieval notion of teleology, or its more modern step-child, Intelligent Design. The underlying assumption here is that everything exists for a purpose, or naturally tends towards a predetermined end. But if there is no Designer (and Dr. Fincke assures us that there is not), and if everything came about through a blind, purposeless, impersonal, natural process, how can anything properly be said to have a specific "function"? Isn't the "function" the purpose for which something was designed?
    Dr. Fincke might reply that natural selection supplies function. If the iron rule of evolution is "the survival of the fittest," then whatever enhances the chances of the human species for survival would be "moral."
    But to make matters even more complicated and confusing, if we are all in an ongoing process of evolution, then there really are not fixed categories in nature. Everything is in a state of flux. And if there are no fixed categories then there are not fixed functions. The species is constantly being "redesigned," as it were. Thus what may appear to be dysfunctional today may simply be a transition to something more functional tomorrow. And since we cannot predict what tomorrow may hold, how can we say the function of a given thing may become?
    By either standard, whether by design or by accident, it is hard to see how homosexuality could conform to our functionality. The obvious function of our reproductive organs is, well, reproduction, and that requires a heterosexual relationship. From a traditional, theistic perspective, homosexuality is a "perversion," a deviation form the divinely ordained norm. From an evolutionary standpoint, it would constitute a regressive tendency that diminishes the species' chances for survival. What the ancients understood and we moderns have forgotten, the welfare of humanity depends on women having babies. How then does homosexuality enhance functionality?

    But the problem of assigning function becomes even more perplexing when we consider the possibilities of the human imagination. How we are not talking about what exists now, but rather about what might come into being. But of the myriad possibilities for future development, which ones should we choose? Do we focus on our physical and material well-being, or is there a spiritual and aesthetic side to life as well? Do we wish to maximize individual freedom, or should we strive for the common good? Does social justice consist in equality of outcome, or merely in equality of opportunity? Sparta and Athens gave different answers to questions life these.

    In the final analysis, it is not function that determines values, but values that determine function. We first decide what we want to achieve, and we set goals for ourselves. It is the goals that determine whether or not something is functional. Thus in the broader realm of human culture, functionality is determined by our a priori values.

 

Searching for Utopia

 

    Philosophers, in fact, have never been able to reach a consensus as to what our values should be. But why is this so? Dr. Fincke himself hints at the underlying reason when he speaks of "those flourishing goods which we all most basically value," but then adds "or would if we understood properly." Why don't we "understand properly"?

    It could be argued that if people "understood properly," they would want to live in a society in which everyone lived by the Golden Rule. It would be a society in which everyone dealt honestly, respected each other's dignity and rights, and looked after each other's welfare. It would be a society entirely free of poverty, crime and war. Everyone would have access to healthcare. In other words, if everyone understood properly, they would arrive at pretty much the same conclusion that Jesus did in the Sermon on the Mount.

    Why don't we then? The answer lies in human nature. We are wedded to the iron law of self-interest. Rationally we know that everyone would be better off if we were all altruists, if they realized, as Dr. Fincke put it, that "there are some rules worth adhering to even when they violate our short term interest because they contribute vitally to the group's thriving which indirectly is in our own long term interest. . ." But when the interests of society come into conflict with our individual self interest, we hesitate. We are back where we started. The simple fact of the matter is that sometimes crime pays.

    Even "enlightened self-interest" is still self-interest. As long as we are wedded to self-interest we are bound to negotiate with the rest of society to find a compromise. The end result is something less than Utopia. A morality based on "indirect consequentialism" and "modest, non-absolutist, instrumental moral norms" is ultimately a morality of convenience. Concepts such as "duty," "honor," and "integrity" evaporate. Can this really be called "morality"? Is morality really nothing more than avoiding negative consequences? We are afraid that in the end Dr. Fincke's solution leaves us unsatisfied.

    But more to the point, why do we think that certain actions are somehow morally wrong even when they are perfectly legal and even patently successful? How could we argue with success?

    The answer is that we have been endowed with a conscience. What sets us apart as human beings from the animal kingdom is our sense of morality. We do not simply act of instinct and conditioning as the animals do, but have a definite sense that certain things are right and others wrong. We feel an uncanny sense of accountability to some standard of conduct outside of ourselves, and we feel a sense of guilt and shame when we violate it. It is nothing less than the Law of God written upon our hearts, and it is an important evidence for the existence of the Deity.

            "He has shown you, O man, what is good;

             And what does the Lord require of you

             But to do justly,

             To love mercy,

             And to walk humbly with your God?"

                                (Mic. 6:8; NKJV)

Related blog posts:
Atheism and Morality 
Good Without God? 
A Scientific Basis for Morality? 
Alasdair MacIntyre: A Study in Moral Theory 
The Case for Moral Absolutes

 
    

What God Thinks About Modern Western Society

    We have been considering some of the differences between Christianity and Islam, and have noted that the concept of jihad is rooted both in the Quran and Islamic history. But does that make Western society superior to the Islamic world? What does God think about us?
    Atheists sometimes advance what is known as the moral argument against the Bible: the Bible cannot possibly be taken seriously as a moral guide because it shocks and offends our sensibilities. The critics who advance this argument will point to certain episodes, mostly contained in the Old Testament, such as Abraham being told to sacrifice his son Isaac, the Israelites being told to wipe out the Canaanites, the toleration of slavery, and the treatment of women generally. The argument is then made that the Bible reflects the barbaric standards of a primitive society, and therefore cannot be taken seriously today.
    The criticism, however, masks a fatal weakness on the part of the critic. In order to sit in judgment on the Bible, one must have a standard external to the Bible by which to judge it. But what is the standard, and where does it come from? When pressed the critic is generally forced to admit that there is no standard – most modern secular critics of the Bible do not admit the existence of moral absolutes. In their view there is no universally binding moral code. Morality is culturally relative.
    But if morality is culturally relative, how can someone in one culture sit in judgment on another culture? He is inevitably applying the culturally relative standards of his own, modern, Western society on others. One might ask, however, how a modern society that could drop an atomic bomb on a civilian population during World War II could sit in judgment of an ancient moral code that contains such quaint aphorisms as "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," or how a society that can support a multi-billion dollar sex industry can criticize the way women were treated in the Bible, but such is the arrogance of modern Western (politically correct) society.

Modern Progress

    But beyond that we ask the fundamental question: should we judge God by our standards, or should we judge ourselves by His? Exactly who or what determines right and wrong in the first place? Once it is conceded that God exists, the answer is obvious. If God is the Creator, Sustainer, and Judge, His will is normative. His opinion is the only one that counts. It is for us to comply with His standards.
    In point of fact God has told us what He thinks of us. In Romans 1:18-32 we have a scathing critique of a society in deep moral decline – and it is an apt description of us.
    The apostle Paul is writing to the early Christian church in the city of Rome. He had never been there before, and he was describing to the Roman Christians his mission and his message. In setting the stage for his exposition of the Christian gospel he records his impressions of Graeco-Roman society. It is a remarkable piece of psychological insight.
    Interestingly, in his analysis of human society he traces the moral decline to a form of secularism. "The wrath of God," he says, "is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men . . ." (Rom. 1:18; NKJV). "Ungodliness" is the failure, or perhaps we should say, the refusal to acknowledge God. "Unrighteousness" is the failure to live by His laws. What makes this a crime in God's sight? The fact that God is our Creator and we owe everything to Him. We are surrounded by evidence in nature of God's wisdom and power, and our conscience bears witness to His existence as well. Hence our refusal to acknowledge His is nothing less that a species of moral rebellion against our Creator. It is the clenched fist of human defiance, and if affects our whole way of looking at reality. They "became futile in their thoughts, and their foolish hearts were darkened. Professing to be wise, they became fools . . ." (vv. 21,22).
    And how does God respond to this? "Therefore God also gave them up to uncleanness, in the lusts of their hearts, to dishonor their bodies among themselves" (v. 24). As hard as it may seem to believe, God sometimes abandons us to our own lusts. People sometimes say that they see no evidence of God at work in the world today, and up to a point they are absolutely right. God is largely absent from our world, and for good reason. When we ignore Him, when we systematically exclude Him from our thinking and our lives, we fall under His judgment. He leaves us to our own devices.
    The "sexual revolution" is a symptom of this abandonment by God, and the prevalence of homosexuality is specifically mentioned as a particularly egregious example of this. "For this reason God gave them up to vile passions. For even their women exchanged the natural use for what is against nature. Likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust for one another, men with men committing what is shameful" (vv. 26,27). It is a picture of a society sunk in moral degeneracy.
    The terminal stage of social and moral decline is marked by a wide range of compulsive, anti-social and self-destructive behavior. And not only is the behavior indulged in, it is openly condoned. " . . . who knowing the righteous judgment of God, that those who practice such things are deserving death, not only do the same but also approve of those who practice them" (v. 32). It has become a truly godless society.
    It is not hard to see the parallels with modern western society. We have witnessed the radical secularization of our culture, and with it the breakdown of public morality. We have become sexually permissive, and marriage has largely become a meaningless institution. A whole generation of children is being reared in dysfunctional one-parent households. Yet even as we careen toward the precipice of social disintegration, we lack the presence of mind to turn around. We have become a morally bankrupt society bent on self-destruction.
    "And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a debased mind, to do those things which are not fitting . . . " (v. 28).

For a fascinating article by Rod Dreher of The American Conservative on gay marriage and the sexual revolution, see Sex After Christianity

Dear Dan Barker – III

How do I decide what is right and wrong?

Dear Mr. Barker,
    We have been considering your "letter from God," and come to the third section, in which you ask the question, how would God know the difference between good and evil? We take it that your aim here is to challenge what is known as the Divine Command Theory of morality.
    You suggest that the Divine Command Theory would make morality purely arbitrary. God would simply make something up and impose it upon mankind by legislative fiat. If, on the other hand, you suggest, God conforms to a standard external to Himself, then He is obviously not free, and hence less than God.
    We are frankly amazed that atheists have such difficulty with so simple a concept. It is a bit like having to explain to a new employee why he has to follow the boss's directions. It is a simple matter of who is in charge, and in this case it is not us.
    So you want to know how God decides what is right and what is wrong? The answer is that moral law is largely determined by two factors. The first is God's own character. "But thou, O Lord, art a God full of compassion, and gracious, longsuffering, and plenteous in mercy and truth" (Ps. 86:15). It is precisely because He is a God of compassion, that He hates injustice, cruelty and oppression of every kind. "For the Lord trieth the righteous: but the wicked and him that loveth violence his soul hateth" (Ps. 11:5). He does not view evil with the eye of detached indifference.
    You object that if God has a "nature" (defined as His character or attributes), then He is not free. You imagine God as saying, "If my nature is clearly defined, then I am limited. I am not God" (p. 154). But that is exactly what the Bible says about God: He has a clearly defined nature, and therefore cannot act contrary to it. That is why God is trustworthy: He is not arbitrary or capricious, a cruel, unpredictable tyrant. "It is of the Lord's mercies that we are not consumed, because his compassions fail not. They are new every morning: great is thy faithfulness" (Lam. 3:22,23).
    The other major factor that determines God's moral law is His creative purpose for us. We were designed to function a certain way in human society, and some of God's laws are frankly intended to protect us from each other.
    Take, for example, the Sabbath. You seem to have a major problem with this one. You picture God as saying, "In fact, I'll make it one of my Ten Commandments and I'll order your execution if you disobey it. This all makes perfect sense, though I don't know why" (p. 153).
    Now if you are an atheist, and all you have to live for is filthy lucre, and you really don't care about the well-being of your fellow human beings, then, granted, the Sabbath is a major encumbrance. You are forced to shut down your business one day a week when you could be making money 24/7. God, however, is concerned with more than just your bank account. "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath . . ." (Mark 2:27). What God knows, and what we often fail to appreciate, is that we need periodic physical rest, we need to spend time with our families, and we need to put life in its proper perspective. Life is more than just making money.
    In the next chapter of your book ("The Bible and Morality") you state that "Only three of the Ten Commandments have any relevance to American law: homicide, theft and perjury." You then add the parenthetical note: :"Adultery and Sabbath laws are still on the books in some states, but they are artifacts of theocracy" (p. 186). Now that the prohibitions against Sabbath-breaking and adultery no longer "have any relevance to American law," is it a mere coincidence that our family structure is crumbling? The anomaly of the situation was recently brought out, no doubt inadvertently, by President Obama. In his Second Inaugural Address he gave a ringing endorsement to same sex marriage. But then in his State of the Union Address not long afterwards he called for the expansion of preschool programs to overcome the learning deficit among many youngsters. What research shows, however, is that academic performance is directly tied to family stability. Poor learners typically come from dysfunctional families. If the President was really concerned about the well-being of America's children he would defend the traditional family. The price we pay as a society for our "progressive" social attitudes can be measured precisely in the tax dollars spent on health and family services. Sometimes when we try to be wiser than God we wind up hurting ourselves.
    If God exists His will is normative. If He does not exist, morality becomes a matter of what we can get away with. In that scenario it is useless to pretend that there is anything that is truly "right" or "wrong." There is no universally binding code of conduct. 

Related blog posts:
What Is Morality? 
What God Requires 
The Case for Moral Absolutes 
Capitalism and the Sabbath 
The Future of Playboy America 

Dear Dan Barker – I

    In his book godless: How an Evangelical Preacher Became One of America's Leading Atheists, Dan Barker has a chapter entitled "Dear Theologian." It is written as though it were a letter from God addressed to theologians, and in it Mr. Barker raises questions about what he evidently considers to be the major conundrums of theology. It is a clever literary device, but as a piece of argumentation it leaves much to be desired.
    We will not presume to speak on behalf of God – Mr. Barker's attempt to do so is frankly sacrilegious. But since we do have an acquaintance with the Bible and Christian theology, we will venture to reply on behalf of the theologians. As Mr. Barker's chapter is divided into three main sections, each revolving around a principle question, we will attempt to address each question in a separate blog post. Today we begin with:

 
Where did I come from?

Dear Mr. Barker,
    We read your letter addressed to us, and it goes without saying that we were hardly amused. You are ever the Sophist – witty, urbane and cultured, but skilled at dancing around a question. The issues you raise, however, are important, and merit consideration more serious than you gave them.
    In the first section of your chapter you challenged the argument from design. You insisted that if the appearance of design in nature calls for a designer, then the Designer Himself must also have been designed, since He would be a rational being Himself, and therefore would also have the appearance of design. At one point you imagine God telling theologians "If you say that everything needs a designer and then say that not everything (Me) needs a designer, aren't you contradicting yourself?" (p. 146).

Caspar David Friedrich, The Stages of Life

    That is a clever way of putting it, but it misses the point. First of all, it is a caricature of what we are actually saying. No one ever intended to say "everything" (including God Himself) "needs a designer." Our point is that nature evinces design, and therefore must have been created by an intelligent Being. But more to the point, as you well know, the Christian position has always been that God is the eternal, self-existing First Cause – the unmoved Mover of the universe. He is the ultimate reality, and therefore not dependent upon anything else.
    The problem with your argument is that it is based on a false analogy between the temporal and eternal, between the human and divine. As human beings we are conscious of the limitations and variability of temporal existence. ". . . from dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." We are each aware of having had a specific beginning, and we know that we shall each have a definite end. In between all is change and flux. And if everything in nature has a beginning, it must have had a cause which brought it into existence. Order does not spontaneously arise out of chaos, and life is not spontaneously generated in inanimate objects. What, then, is the source of it all? Nature points to something outside of itself, some superior Being from which it derives its structure and energy.
    How did life begin? Why does anything exist at all? If you think about it for a few minutes, it becomes apparent that there are only a few possible answers. One possibility is that matter and energy have always existed – that there is an infinite regression of natural causes. But that still doesn't account for the rational order in the universe, nor does it explain the origin of life or of intelligence. Moreover, many scientists now believe that the universe started with a "Big Bang." In other words, the universe had a definite beginning. But what caused the "Bang"?
    Another suggestion that has been made is that reality is self-creating. But this is palpable nonsense. If something does not exist, it lacks the power to do anything, let alone bring itself into existence. This hypothesis is a plunge into the bath of irrationality.
    That leaves us with one other possibility: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." This hypothesis satisfactorily explains what we can actually observe in the universe: rational order, life, and human intelligence. When one sees a garden, one naturally assumes the existence of a gardener.
    You then objected that you don't know what it meant to be "eternally existent," that you did not understand why something eternal is greater than something temporal, and you said "I don't see how being eternal solves the problem" (p. 147). Admittedly the concept of eternity is a difficult one for us to wrap our minds around, but that does not make the concept itself invalid. May we point out to you that if God is eternal He has no beginning? Nothing was required to bring Him into existence, and He is not dependent upon anything outside of Himself. So you ask the question, why does nature require a designer but not God? The answer is that it is the difference between having a finite, temporal existence and being eternal, uncreated and self-existent. It is the difference between being a part of nature and being the Creator of nature. God is Lord of heaven and earth.
    

Thomas Jefferson, Dan Barker and Natural Rights

Dan Barker

    In his book godless (sic), near the end of his chapter on morality, atheist Dan Barker responds to a comment made by Clifford Goldstein, the editor of the Seventh Day Adventist Liberty Magazine. Mr. Goldstein argued that "Had Jefferson been influenced by Darwin instead of Locke, Joseph Stalin's views on religious liberty would have been deemed progressive." Goldstein went on to say that in a "Darwinian universe" truth rests "on a foundation as whimsical as the electorate or whichever despot happens to be in control" (quoted in Barker, pp. 216-217).
    Mr. Barker responded essentially by sidestepping the objection. Instead of addressing the point made by Mr. Goldstein, Mr. Barker asserted that the God of the Bible is a tyrant, a claim he attempted to support by taking a number of Old Testament texts out of context. He then further asserted that Hitler had misused Darwin. He then proceeded to misconstrue Jefferson in much the same way he often does the Bible.
    First of all, Mr. Barker claims that when Jefferson, as a Deist, used the word "Creator" in the Declaration of Independence he meant something less personal than the biblical God, something more akin to "nature" rather than "Jehovah." He then goes on to make the extraordinary assertion that "when Jefferson claimed that all people are 'endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights,' he could not have meant 'endowed' in the sense of a sovereign granting a privilege that might be denied" (p. 218). Mr. Barker tries to support this dubious contention by asserting that "if something can be endowed, then it can be un-endowed," and therefore is not inalienable. According to Mr. Barker, and "inalienable right" that is "endowed" is an oxymoron.
    Mr. Barker then goes on to say that "a 'natural right' is a claim to a freedom, privilege or power that you possess inherently, by nature . . . " (Ibid.). According to him, what Jefferson really meant was that "we are 'endowed by nature' with common human needs," and are therefore "justified in expecting society to honor our right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" (p. 219).

Thomas Jefferson

    What Mr. Barker has done here is to substitute his own theory of natural rights for Jefferson's. Jefferson quite plainly said "endowed by their Creator," and clearly intended that phrase to be understood literally. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, written several years after the Declaration of Independence, commenting on the institution of slavery he declared, "And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with His wrath? Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever; that considering numbers, nature and natural means only, a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of situation is among possible events; that it may become probably by supernatural interference! The Almighty has no attribute which can take side with us in such a contest" (Query XVIII). Jefferson was hardly an orthodox believer, and he emphatically rejected the doctrine of the Trinity; yet here he ascribes to God the attributes of wrath and justice,, expresses his faith in divine providence, and quite explicitly traces the source of our liberties to God Himself. It is hard, then, to mistake his meaning in the Declaration.
    Part of the problem here is that Jefferson and Mr. Barker are working with entirely different conceptions of "natural law." When Jefferson used the phrase, "the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them," what he had in mind was a concept that had a long history in Western thought. As explained by the great 18^th Century English jurist Sir William Blackstone, the "law of nature" consists of "the eternal, immutable, laws of good and evil, to which the Creator Himself in all His dispensations conforms: and which He has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such, among others, are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to everyone his due . . ."
    But Mr. Barker's view of natural law is far different. "I learned that relativism is all we've got. Human values are not absolutes – they are relative to human needs. The humanistic answer to morality, if the question is properly understood, is that the basis for values lies in nature. Since we are a part of nature, and since there is nothing 'beyond' nature, it is necessary to assign value to actions in the context of nature itself" (p. 210). "'Value' is a concept of relative worth. And since concepts, as far as we know, exist only in our brain, which are material things, it is meaningless, even dangerous, to talk of cosmic moral attributes" (p. 211).
    Mr. Barker claims that nature has endowed us with common human needs, and that therefore we are "justified in expecting society to honor our right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." But since when are "liberty" and " the pursuit of happiness" human "needs"? It is entirely possible biologically to survive without them, and the great masses of mankind have, in fact, done so. And since when does a "need" constitute a "right" to have something? Why are others obligated to "respect my right" to have something?
    The incongruity of Mr. Barker's assertions are especially apparent when we consider his view of nature itself: "Living organisms are the result of the mindless uncaring reality of natural selection" that uses "the blunt process of weeding out failures, which are denied the opportunity to reproduce by being eaten, starved, frozen, killed in competition, or not being chosen as a mate, and so on" (p. 106). In this context it is ludicrous to speak of "rights."
    Mr. Goldstein was right: had Jefferson been influence by Darwin instead of Locke, Joseph Stalin's views would been deemed progressive, and in a Darwinian universe truth does rest on the whims of whatever despot happens to be in control. Rights are inalienable only when they are sanctioned by a higher law, a law that transcends all human authority. If God had not said, "Thou shalt not kill," there would be no "inalienable right to life," and the U.S. Supreme Court amply demonstrated in Roe v. Wade. There would only be "nature, red in tooth and claw" (Tennyson).

Atheism and Morality

    What do atheists think about morality? Many would say, nothing in particular. Atheism is nothing more than lack of belief in a deity. It implies nothing about anything else, so they say. The claim, however, deserves to be examined closely.

    What do atheists think? We can take as our authority on the subject Mr. Dan Barker. A former evangelical preacher turned atheist, he is now the co-president of the Freedom from Religion Foundation, the largest organization of atheists and agnostics in America. During his Christian days he attended Azusa Pacific College, a Christian institution of higher learning located in California, and worked for a number of years as an evangelist and Christian musician. Since becoming an atheist he and his first wife (who remains a committed Christian) divorced, and he married Annie Laurie Gaylor, the other co-president of the Foundation and the daughter of Anne Gayor, who is herself a distinguished atheist. Mr. Barker travels widely and frequently engages in public debates with leading Christian apologists. His book, godless: How an Evangelical Preacher Became One of America's Leading Atheists, comes with the enthusiastic endorsements of such well-known figures as Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins.
Thus Mr. Barker is uniquely positioned to discuss both sides of the issue.
    The book is both entertaining and informative. Mr. Barker tells us a great deal about contemporary atheism. He explains to us, for instance, the meaning of the word "atheist": "It turns out that atheism means much less than I had thought. It is merely the lack of theism. It is not a philosophy of life and it offers no values. It predicts nothing of morality or motives" (p. 97). He goes on to say that even though atheism, per se, implies nothing about morality, most atheists do, in fact, "want to go beyond zero" and "embrace a positive philosophy such as humanism, feminism or another naturalistic ethical system. Or, they will promote charity, philanthropy, learning, science, beauty, art – all those human activities that enhance life." But he is careful to add, "But to be an atheist, you don't need any positive philosophy at all or need to be a good person. You are an atheist if you lack a belief in a god" (Ibid.).
    Make no mistake about it, Mr. Barker reassures us that most atheists are indeed good people. "Since leaving fundamentalism I have noticed that contrary to what I used to preach, most atheists seem to be deeply concerned with human values" (p. 99). But how do they reconcile this deep concern with their non-belief in God? What is the basis for their ethics? Mr. Barker tells us "We atheists find our basis for morality in nature" (p. 213). He says "Most atheists think moral values are real, but that does not mean that they are 'objective' . . . Most atheists think that values, though not objective things in themselves, can be objectively justified by reference to the real world. Our actions have consequences, and these consequences can be objectively measured" (p. 213).
    Mr. Barker goes on to qualify this statement somewhat: "Although most atheists accept the importance of morality, this is not conceding that morality exists in the universe – that it is a cosmic object waiting to be discovered. The word 'morality' is just a label for a concept, and concepts exist only in minds" (p. 214). But this involves Mr. Barker in a contradiction. Do values refer to something in the real world, or do they only exist in the mind? Do they describe objective reality or do they not?
    How, then, can Mr. Barker objectively justify values "by reference to the real world"? He claims that it is because "actions have consequences, and the consequences can be objectively measured." But the devil, as they say, is in the details. First of all, how does he conceive of "the real world"? He tells us: "'Nature' . . . means something. Darwinism shows us that all living organisms are the result of a natural evolutionary process. We have been fashioned by the laws of nature" (p. 219). He then proceeds to explain how evolution works: "It is design by extinction, but the way a changing environment automatically disallows organisms that happen not to be adapted, leaving the 'fittest' behind, if any" (Ibid.). Perhaps global warming is nature's way of "automatically disallowing" the human race as "not adapted"! But to continue: "We are not above nature. We are not just a part of nature. We are nature. We are natural creatures in a natural environment" (p. 220).
    One would think that any "naturalistic ethical system" would lead straight to Social Darwinism. But then Mr. Barker tells us, "Humanists think we should do good for goodness' sake, not for the selfish prospect or reaping individual rewards or avoiding punishment" (p. 220). We are relieved that Mr. Barker wishes to extricate himself from the law of the jungle, but we fear that he has taken an irrational leap of faith here. Why would any rational, thinking human being, being persuaded that Mr. Barker's description of nature is accurate, not want to pursue good "for the selfish prospect of reaping individual rewards or avoiding punishment"? After all, on Mr. Barker's scheme of things, isn't life all about preserving self?
    Mr. Barker practically admits that atheists have no rational basis for the kind of altruism that he advocates. Describing the good deeds that atheists actually do perform, he says "Whatever the moral motivation may be it likely originates in a mind that is deeply concerned with fairness and compassion, love for real human beings and concern for this world, not merely a rational approach to truth that rejects arguments for a supernatural being" (p. 100). He tells us that "To be moral, atheists have access to the simple tools of reason and kindness. There is no cosmic code book directing our actions" (p. 214). Quite remarkably he tries to argue that "Compassion is, after all, a characteristic of being human . . . We are not corrupt, evil creatures" (p. 216). But just previously he had said, "Jefferson may have been wrong to call compassion an 'instinct' because many appear not to have it – it seems optional" (p. 215). So what is Mr. Barker's answer to them? Aside from the criminal justice system he says that we "can choose to actively exhort others to join us in expressing our innate feelings of altruism and compassion" (p. 216). Ah, once a preacher always a preacher! The only problem here is that it is hard to see how Mr. Barker can exhort anyone to a life of virtue if there is no real, objective, universally binding rule of conduct and there is an immediate benefit to be gained by being selfish.
    It is undoubtedly true, as Mr. Barker tells us, that most atheists want to embrace "a positive philosophy such as humanism, feminism or another naturalistic ethical system." The problem is that they can do so only by not applying "a rational approach to truth that rejects arguments for a supernatural being." In the final analysis humanism and feminism rest on no surer foundation than Christianity. If one is fantasy and self-delusion then they all are. And an "naturalistic ethical system" involves the difficulty of deducing an "ought" from an "is." My dog does not engage in moral ratiocination; he simply pounces on the prey.
    In the end there is no morality apart from God.

You might also enjoy:
 A Scientific Basis for Morality? 
Letter to a Unitarian Minister 

Good Without God?

Review:
    Good Without God: What a Billion Nonrelgious People Do Believe
    Greg M. Epstein
    Harper, 2010
    239 pp; pb

 
    Is it possible to be an atheist and still be a good person? Greg Epstein certainly thinks so. Mr. Epstein is the Humanist chaplain at Harvard University, and his book is an attempt to explain how it is possible for someone to be an atheist and yet uphold human values at the same time. He is intelligent, widely read, and displays, if we may say so, a "pastoral" regard for his fellow human beings. Mr. Epstein himself clearly practices what he preaches.
    Mr. Epstein makes it clear at the outset that he is an atheist and accepts evolution as an established fact. He also accepts the logical implication of this: evolution is an unguided process, and therefore "true nobility for us lies in being honest about being able to discern no purpose given to human beings by the Big Bang . . . The only purposes we've ever been able to understand are the purposes we have created and chosen" (p. 9). Moreover there are no objective moral standards: "Our morality is based on human needs and social contracts, and these things are not perfectly, eternally objective" (p. 35). He then follows this train of thought to its logical conclusion: "And if no morality is timeless and eternal, then we will never be able to fool ourselves into thinking that there is one set of easy and obvious answers to questions about euthanasia, abortion, capital punishment, or other such issues." (p. 36).
    What Mr. Epstein offers in its stead as an ethical system is a form of Utilitarianism. He does struggle a bit in Chapter 3 trying to define "the good," saying that "happiness" is an inadequate standard. He finally settles on "the dignity of mutual concern and connection" and "self-fulfillment through service to humanity's highest ideals" as "more than enough reason to be good without God" (p. 103).
    In a sense what Mr. Epstein has done is to provide a rational justification for the way most people make ethical decisions. They absorb certain values through their culture, largely through their parents and teachers, they live within a given legal system, and they try to earn and maintain the goodwill of their fellows. In short, they try to operate on the basis of enlightened self-interest. They realize that no man is an island, and that no one can achieve happiness as an individual unless he works cooperatively with the broader society.
    Mr. Epstein is certainly to be admired for his passionate commitment to human values and ideals. Yet we are afraid that his enterprise is fraught with difficulties. He tells us at one point that Humanists "are committed to treating each other as having inherent worth and dignity" (p. 34 – this is actually a quote from the Humanist Manifesto – III – cf. p. 224). But if we are the products of a blind, purposeless process of evolution, what "inherent worth and dignity" do we possess? Human beings are just one of millions of species that inhabit the planet. Mr. Epstein tries to answer the question, but we think unconvincingly. If our morality is "based on human needs and social contracts," we can assign worth and dignity to other human beings, but they do not possess these qualities inherently. Qualitatively we are not different from dogs or trees. In and of ourselves we are mere accidents of nature.
    Moreover, if there is no objective moral code, it is hard to see how there can be "human rights." Mr. Epstein cites Alan Dershowitz in support of the idea that human rights evolve from human experience – that an egregious wrong gives rise to the notion of an opposing right.
    But absent an objective moral code there is nothing in the reality of things that says we have a "right" to anything. Either there is a real difference between right and wrong or there is not. And if there is not, why shouldn't a person harm someone else, if he thinks that by so doing he can advance his own self-interest? People lie, cheat and steal all the time. Even "enlightened self-interest" is still self-interest. Doesn't it come down to a shrewd calculation of what we can get away with? And in the struggle for survival doesn't might, in the final analysis, make right? What if Germany had won World War II? What might the moral lesson then have been?
    Mr. Epstein cites, as one of his reasons for rejecting the Divine Command Theory of morality, the inability of religious leaders to agree as to what the Deity has commanded. Yet might this not apply with equal force to Humanism? In the last chapter of his book Mr. Epstein describes how difficult it is for Humanists to reach a consensus or even to organize effectively, comparing it to herding cats. He tells us that he and his fellow Humanists "value the messy, painstaking process of bringing a group of individuals to an evolving, overlapping consensus" (p. 222), and assures us that there no "one set of easy and obvious answers" (p. 36). In other words, Humanism has done no better at providing answers than has traditional religion.
    We fear, then, that Mr. Epstein has led us into the Great Dismal Swamp of moral confusion. The reader is probably less certain about morality after reading his book than he was before. There is, however, a way out of the swamp. It is the light of God's Word.

Related blog posts:
A Scientific Basis for Morality? 
Letter to a Unitarian Minister 
The Case for Moral Absolutes 

“Thy Will Be Done”

    The Third Petition in the Lord's Prayer asks "Your will be done On earth as it is in heaven" (Matt. 6:10; NKJV). Here there is a contrast drawn between heaven and earth. Heaven is where God's will is always done, a perfect paradise where truth and justice always prevail. Earth, however, is another story altogether. Here we are confronted on every hand with the ill effects of man's rebellion against God – cruelty and exploitation, corruption and injustice, tyranny and war. Our desire and our prayer, therefore, is for earth to be brought into conformity with heaven.
    It is here that the contrast between Christian theism and atheism is cast in bold relief. An atheist insists that heaven does not exist, that earth is all there is. As for ourselves, we can hardly think of an idea more perverse. By eliminating the will of God atheism is, in effect, erasing all the higher human values; it is the negation of all ideals. It denies the existence of a transcendent order, of a universal, objective standard of morality, of meaning and purpose in life, of ultimate justice, and robs us of the hope of life after death. It leaves us with nothing but the toil and sorrow of everyday life, to snatch whatever fleeting pleasures blind fate may strew across our path.
    But at this point the atheist will surely object. "We can create our own values, By means of a kind of social contract we can create a society to our own liking: liberal, humane, and democratic."
    This vision of a secular utopia is certainly very appealing, but it is a mirage. First of all, in the atheistic worldview the values of human dignity, equality and democracy occupy the same place as God and religion – they are all imaginary, artificial constructs of the human mind with no basis in objective reality, mere wish fulfillment. Whatever scorn and abuse the atheist pours on religion he must also pour on liberal democracy as well: it is all alike a delusion.
    But secondly, this vision of a secular utopia fails to reckon with human nature. If we could create the kind of society we would like, what kind of society would it be? The secular liberal is quick to answer, "one that is marked by a respect for individual human rights, and by freedom and equality." But in real life it rarely works out that way. Driven by individual self-interest we push and shove our way to the front of the line, and hurt each other in the process. Crime is a daily fact of life, and whole governments have been known to have been corrupted. If there is no transcendent standard of right and wrong, no universal law that is binding, and no eternal rewards and punishments, then why should anyone not try to see what they can get away with? In the end might makes right and victory goes to the strong, who rarely use their power for the benefit of society as a whole. In the end justice is but a mirage.
    "Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven" expresses the deepest longing of the human heart. Granted, part of us rebels against the idea of divine authority: we don't want to be subject to the will of a Supreme Being. But another part of us dreads the prospect of living in a universe in which there is no final justice, where cruelty and inhumanity reign supreme, and there is no retribution for evil. In short, a world without God is a fool's paradise.

Why Sam Harris Is an Atheist

    As we saw in our last blog post, Sam Harris set out to demonstrate "How Science Can Determine Human Values," to quote the subtitle of his book. It was a bold attempt to find an objective moral standard based on science. And, in our opinion, he largely failed in the attempt. While he offered many opinions of his own on a wide variety of subjects, he gave few specifically scientific reasons for them. Instead he mainly went over the same ground that numerous theologians and philosophers have traversed for many centuries before, all the while not professing to see any valid objections to his own highly colored opinions. In the end Dr. Harris comes across as an atheist trying hard not to sound like Nietzsche.
    In his wandering peregrinations of the mind, however, Dr. Harris stumbled into an age-old trap, the hoary controversy over determinism v. free will. Dr. Harris says that there is no such thing as a free will, but unlike religious determinists of the past such as Augustine, Calvin and Edwards, Dr. Harris is an atheist and a thoroughgoing materialist (and a neuroscientist at that). But this creates a dilemma for him. On the one hand he wants to say that everything that occurs in the human mind has a natural cause, and therefore can be studied scientifically by neuroscientists such as himself. But if this is the case, Dr. Harris' own thought processes have been biologically determined, which raises an intriguing question: how can scientific reasoning be valid? There would be no necessary correlation between what goes on in the scientist's mind and external reality.
    Dr. Harris himself is aware of the problem and states it this way: "The problem is that no account of causality leaves room for free will. Thoughts, moods and desires of every sort simply spring into view – and move us, or fail to move us, for reasons that are, from a subjective point of view, perfectly inscrutable" (p. 104).
    This, in turn, affects our view of moral responsibility. Dr. Harris challenges traditional notions of sin and culpability. If we only understood the underling causes of bad behavior we would be more compassionate with the erring. At the same time it would open the door to a scientific solution to the problem of human evil.
    But then Dr. Harris seems to step back and modify his position somewhat. He argues that a person could be held responsible for his behavior if he had the intention to do harm. However, if our "thoughts, moods and desires" are rooted in our biology and "simply spring into view," then does not the intention also have an underlying social or biological cause? How then, can we hold a criminal responsible for his actions?
    Moreover, if our thoughts simply spring into view for reasons that are inscrutable, then what about Dr. Harris' own research? It is remarkable that he managed to earn a doctorate from UCLA with thoughts that "simply sprang into view." And how about his book? How did it come about? (It became a New York Times bestseller.) Dr. Harris is caught on the horns of a familiar dilemma: science depends on the assumption of causality in nature; but causality in the mind means that the scientist himself is non-rational. Dr. Harris, it seems, has led us to a dead end.
    Again Dr. Harris appears to back off from his earlier assertions. He tries to argue that while biology and physical circumstances provide the motives for thought and action, that does not mean that we cannot still think rationally. "The fact that reason must be rooted in biology does not negate the principles of reason" (p. 131), he says. We are motivated to think, but we still think. "There is a sense in which all cognition can be said to be motivated: one is motivated to understand the world, to be in touch with reality, to remove doubt . . .As we have begun to see, all reasoning may be inextricable from emotion" (p. 126). But then he goes on to say ". . . the inseparability of reason and emotion confirms that the validity of belief cannot merely depend on the conviction felt by its adherents; it rests on the claims of evidence and argument that link it to reality" (pp. 126-127). It is a little hard to see how the one "confirms" its seeming opposite, but apparently what Dr. Harris has in mind is that our thought processes, while being driven and directed by our emotions, are nevertheless still capable of being rational. A passion for truth should lead us to pursue the truth with all the mental acumen and intellectual rigor at our command. But the problem remains: if everything we think is the result of chemical changes in our brains, how much mental acumen do we really have? Is it not all an illusion?
    Dr. Harris is quick to point out how emotion and bias influence the thinking of religious believers and social conservatives. But the argument is a two-edged sword – it cuts both ways. Is it not possible that Dr. Harris' own thinking has been shaped and molded by his personal biases? He notes at one point that dopamine receptor genes seem to play a role in religious belief: people with the most active form of the gene seem to be more religious. Might not a prescription for the drug L-dopa take care of Dr. Harris' atheism problem? Is it not possible that he is an atheist because he wants to be an atheist? The devout Christian sees evidence of Intelligent Design everywhere; Dr. Harris sees it nowhere. Has our perception, or lack thereof, been affected by our natural inclinations?

A Scientific Basis for Morality?

Review:
The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values
Sam Harris
Free Press, 2010
307 pp; pb.

 
    The Moral Landscape, by the outspoken New Atheist Sam Harris, is an attempt to find a scientific basis for an objective system of morality. The attempt is a bold one, for conventional wisdom says that it cannot be done. Science cannot deduce an "ought" from an "is."
    Dr. Harris is well aware of the difficulty. He is a neuroscientist with a degree in philosophy. Those on the secular left say that no such objective morality exists, while those on the religious right say that no such morality is possible without reference to a Supreme Being. Dr. Harris, however, thinks that he has found a way out of the difficulty.
    We should note that when Dr. Harris speaks of "morality" he is not talking about a set of unvarying moral precepts or an abstract principle that exists outside of the human mind. He even goes so far as to say that, strictly speaking, morality is not even about an "ought" at all, but rather about how we as humans would like to structure society.
    He argues that most human beings would prefer to live in a well-ordered society that has achieved a high level of peace and prosperity. By the same token almost no sane person would want to live in a poverty stricken country terrorized by corrupt warlords. The answer, then, is to learn how to cooperate with each other in a spirit of reciprocal altruism. And science, he says, can show us how to achieve that. In a word what Dr. Harris offers us is an updated version of Utilitarianism, the idea of the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
    Dr. Harris' grand vision sounds very appealing, but the devil, as they say, is in the details. Dr. Harris' book has received a great deal of attention, much of it critical, and in an afterword to the 2011 paperback edition Dr. Harris responds to some of his more thoughtful critics. In particular he addresses three major criticisms; 1) the Value Problem; 2) the Persuasion Problem; and 3) the Measurement Problem. Due to limitations of space we will confine our attention to the first two.
    Dr. Harris contends that the goal of morality should be the general well-being of conscious beings. But how do we define "well-being"? Good health? Satisfying relationships? Material success? The good feeling that comes from acts of kindness? Religion? Wine, women and song? Dr. Harris offers us plenty of opinions of his own, on everything from burqas to embryonic stem-cell research. But significantly, he rarely provides us with a specifically scientific basis for his opinions, which raises the intriguing question, what is the real source of his values? Since he does not tell us, we can only guess. But the answer, apparently, is either from his own intuitive sense of right and wrong, or else he has borrowed them from his Western (i.e. Judaeo-Christian) culture. We seem to recall Someone else a long time ago telling us about the Golden Rule! That being the case, Dr. Harris has left himself wide open to the criticism from the left: his supposed universal standard of morality rests on nothing more than his own cultural or emotional biases.
    The other problem that Dr. Harris has is what he calls "the Persuasion Problem." The problem here is that Dr. Harris is trying to find a basis for altruism in self-interest. Here is how he himself states the problem: " . . . there is often a tension between the autonomy of the individual and the common good, and many moral problems turn on just how to prioritize competing values" (p. 42). "Prioritize" indeed. Why should anyone think about the common good at all? Dr. Harris says that it is in our own self-interest to do so, and so it is. But in real life self-interest and the common good often collide with each other, and when one's own individual self-interest lies close at hand, the "common good" can seem like a hopelessly vague abstraction. Adam Smith had a surer insight into human nature: capitalism works precisely because it appeals to our selfishness and greed.
    In the final analysis we think that Dr. Harris failed because the tried to combine two opposites: human autonomy and the common good. In so doing he eliminated the element of duty or obligation from morality. In the end his "moral landscape" is neither universal, nor truly moral, nor even scientific. Dr. Harris, it seems, is a law unto himself.

Faith and Reason: the Limitations of Science

One of our fellow bloggers,Tildeb ( questionablemotives.wordpress.com) recently posted several comments on this blog challenging our belief in the existence of God. According to Tildeb, "The most sympathetic and intellectually honest mind-independent answer to the important question Does god exist? is "I don't know.' That is as good as it gets given the available evidence. . ." Tildeb then goes on to define "faith" as "belief that something is true without compelling evidence existing independent of mind . . . the motivation to believe that god exists and is real does not come from reality itself (where the evidence should be overwhelming) but from within the person who wishes to believe."

    We beg to differ. The evidence for the existence of God is overwhelming. We are surrounded by it.

    People have different reasons for embracing Christianity, some more rational than others. But down through the centuries there have been a significant number of intelligent, well-educated people who have given attention to the question, "does God exist?" and have concluded that there is a rational basis for faith -- from Justin Martyr in the Second Century to C.S. Lewis in the Twentieth. Lewis, in fact, gave up atheism to become a Christian.

    Part of the problem is Tildeb's definition of "faith": "belief that something is true without compelling evidence" – evidently a kind of "Sprung ins Dunkel," an existential leap of faith into the dark. But Christian apologetics has traditionally appealed to evidence. Faith is the trust one puts in Christ when one thinks that the evidence is convincing. You weigh the evidence, you become convinced that Jesus really was and is Who He said He is, and you trust in Him as your Savior. It is, for the thinking Christian, a completely rational decision.

    Probably most modern atheists base their skepticism on science, insisting that no evidence exists in nature to indicate the existence of God. The "God hypothesis," they say, is unnecessary. We need, however, to be aware of the limitations of science.

    First of all, science is based on the empirical method. But since science will never have all of the facts at its disposal, its conclusions will always be tentative. The possibility always exists that some new discovery tomorrow will invalidate the conclusions of today. Science can invalidate a truth claim, proving it false, but it can never entirely validate one.

    Secondly, since the empirical method is based solely on what comes through the senses, it generally cannot take cognizance of any possible spiritual or immaterial reality. This means that a philosophy based on science will naturally tend toward materialism, the view that matter and energy are the only reality. It is little wonder , then, that many scientists are skeptical about the existence of God. But that may only point to a defect in their method.

    Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult for science to deduce an "ought" from an "is." Science can give us a description of the way things are; it cannot tell us what they ought to be. Thus in a philosophy of naturalistic materialism the whole matter of morality and human rights becomes problematical. Genocide is an observable fact of life. That it is somehow morally "wrong" is a value judgment that science cannot make. If we are looking to science for answers as to what we should do, we are likely to come up empty.

    But science has an even more severe problem. As noted above, the empirical method is based on sense perceptions. But how do we know that our senses are giving us an accurate picture of reality? How do we know that we are not looking at the world through rose-colored glasses? This was the question raised by David Hume, and it has vexed philosophers ever since. Thus science itself, in the last analysis, is a prisoner of the mind, not sure if anything actually exists externally.

    As a naturalistic method, science is completely compatible with Christianity; science is simply the study of the natural phenomena created by an all-wise and all-powerful God. But when science becomes an all-encompassing worldview, an naturalistic ontology, it comes into direct conflict with religion. And it is as a worldview that science has severe limitations and drawbacks.


 
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